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Abstract
Background: Very little is known regarding the persistence of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses in
aquatic environments in tropical countries, although environmental materials have been suggested to play a role as
reservoirs and sources of transmission for H5N1 viruses.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The survival of HPAI H5N1 viruses in experimental aquatic biotopes (water, mud, aquatic
flora and fauna) relevant to field conditions in Cambodia was investigated. Artificial aquatic biotopes, including simple ones
containing only mud and water, and complex biotopes involving the presence of aquatic flora and fauna, were set up. They
were experimentally contaminated with H5N1 virus. The persistence of HPAI H5N1 virus (local avian and human isolates)
was determined by virus isolation in embryonated chicken eggs and by real-time reverse-polymerase chain reaction.
Persistence of infectious virus did not exceed 4 days, and was only identified in rain water. No infectious virus particles were
detected in pond and lake water or mud even when high inoculum doses were used. However, viral RNA persisted up to
20 days in rain water and 7 days in pond or lake water. Viral RNA was also detected in mud samples, up to 14 days post-
contamination in several cases. Infectious virus and viral RNA was detected in few cases in the aquatic fauna and flora,
especially in bivalves and labyrinth fish, although these organisms seemed to be mostly passive carriers of the virus rather
than host allowing virus replication.
Conclusions/Significance: Although several factors for the survival and persistence of HPAI viruses in the environment are
still to be elucidated, and are particularly hard to control in laboratory conditions, our results, along with previous data,
support the idea that environmental surveillance is of major relevance for avian influenza control programs.
Citation: Horm VS, Gutie ´rrez RA, Nicholls JM, Buchy P (2012) Highly Pathogenic Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Survival in Complex Artificial Aquatic Biotopes. PLoS
ONE 7(4): e34160. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160
Editor: Justin David Brown, University of Georgia, United States of America
Received November 1, 2011; Accepted February 27, 2012; Published April 13, 2012
Copyright:  2012 Horm et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by 6th Framework Program grant FP6-2005-SSP-5-B-INFLUENZA (Resistance of Influenza Viruses in Environmental Reservoirs
and Systems, RIVERS) from the European Union. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: pbuchy@pasteur-kh.org
Introduction
The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus is
a major public health concern in Southeast Asia, where it has
widely spread since its first detection in 1997 [1] and become
enzootic in the region. Cambodia is one of the enzootic countries
in tropical areas which has reported a high fatality rate in humans
(approximately 90%) [2]. Since the first detection of HPAI H5N1
virus in poultry in 2004 and the first human cases of H5N1 virus
infection in 2005, 32 H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and 18 human
cases (16 fatalities) of H5N1 infection have occurred up to now
[2,3]. Direct contact with infected poultry is the main source for
human contamination. However, previous studies provide addi-
tional evidence suggesting bathing or swimming in ponds as a risk
factor for human H5N1 contamination [4]. The H5N1 virus has
been shown to have the ability to persist outside the host, especially
in water [5-9] and H5N1 viral RNA was previously detected in
environmental specimens, including in the surroundings of H5N1
outbreaks areas in Cambodia [10]. Previous studies have described
the survival of H5N1 virus in water, soil or various surfaces in
laboratory-controlled conditions with temperatures usually rang-
ing from 0 to 25uC [5,8,11,12] but very little is known regarding
the persistence of the virus in environment materials such as
surface water, mud, soil in tropical countries where average
temperatures can reach over 35uC in the shade. Data on the
ability of HPAI H5N1 viruses to remain infective outside of the
host is very limited. There also are very few reports discussing the
role of aquatic fauna in the transmission cycle of the H5N1 virus.
An experimental study conducted with low pathogenic avian
influenza (LPAI) demonstrated that Asian clams (Corbicula fluminea)
were capable of removing and reducing the infectivity of avian
influenza viruses (AIVs) in water [13]. On the other hand, a study
by Stumpf et al. showed that zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha)
were able to accumulate LPAI virus from the surrounding water
and to retain the virus in their bodies over an extended period of
time before releasing the virus back into freshwater [14]. These
few studies seem to emphasize the need for more relevant data on
the survival of HPAI H5N1 virus in natural aquatic environments,
including in the presence of aquatic fauna.
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,  Hong  Kong  SAROur objectives in this study were: (1) to describe the survival of
H5N1 virus in water and mud in experimental setting reproducing
as faithfully as possible natural conditions observed in tropical
countries; (2) to determine whether aquatic animals such as fish,
tadpoles, clams, snails, mussels and aquatic flora may be
contaminated and play a role in the persistence of H5N1 virus
in water; (3) to determine whether autochthonous aquatic
organisms such as bivalves (fresh water mussels) and labyrinth
fish (fighting fish) could transmit the virus to each other.
Materials and Methods
BioSafety statement
All experiments using HPAI H5N1 virus and all animal
experiments were performed within the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-
3) laboratory of the Institut Pasteur in Cambodia (IPC), complying
with the Animal Committee regulations of Institut Pasteur in Paris,
France, in accordance with the EC 86/609/CEE directive, and
approved by the Animal Ethics Committee of Institut Pasteur in
Cambodia (permit number: AEC/IPC/002/2008).
Virus
The clade 1, genotype Z, HPAI H5N1 viruses A/Cambodia/
408008/2005 (GenBank accession numbers: HQ664938 to
HQ664945) and A/chicken/Cambodia/LC1AL/2007 (GenBank
accession numbers: HQ200574 to HQ200581) were used to
conduct these experiments. The virus stock was obtained after
propagation in Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) 9-to-11-day-old
embryonated hen eggs, kindly provided by the National
Veterinary Research Institute of Cambodia (NaVRI), Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries (MAFF). The amnio-allantoic
fluid (AAF) from the second passage on SPF eggs was harvested
48 hours after inoculation and stored at 280uC until further use.
Virus titre was determined by calculating the 50% egg infectious
dose (EID50) per mL of virus stock. Titration endpoints were
calculated using the method of Reed and Muench [15].
Mud and water
Mud and water used in the artificial aquatic settings described
below were collected from 2 different ponds (with the landlord’s
official authorization) and from a lake in areas of Kampong Cham
province where an H5N1 virus outbreak had previously occurred.
Some of the experiments also involved the use of rain water which
was collected and stored in big jars within the IPC external
facilities until use. Temperature, pH and conductivity results of all
water samples were recorded on site at the time of collection.
Additional physico-chemical analyses and all microbiological tests
were carried out upon arrival at the laboratory (Table S1). All
water and mud samples were transported at ambient temperature
(,30–35uC) from the collection site to the laboratory within
5 hours. These samples were used to conduct the experiments
within 24 hours after field collection. In the meantime, they were
kept at room temperature (,20–25uC). The absence of virus in all
water and mud samples was verified by qRT-PCR prior to use for
the experiments. Microbiological and additional physico-chemical
parameters were measured in the water samples at the beginning
of the experiments; pH and conductivity results demonstrated very
few or no differences with the measures made previously in the
field (data not shown).
Aquatic flora and fauna
Freshwater flora and fauna used for the artificial aquatic settings
included guppies (Poecilia reticulata), Siamese fighting fish (Betta
splendens), tadpoles (unidentified local species), snails (Sinotaia
quadrata), clams (Corbicula fluminea), mussels (Pilsbryoconcha exilis),
and aquatic plants (Cabomba caroliniana). Fish were bought from
a private stockbreeder and the other organisms were collected
from local rivers or ponds where H5N1 virus circulation was never
reported (no permits required).
Artificial aquatic biotopes: experimental design and
settings
A total of 4 different series of experiments were carried out.
Two series were conducted to investigate the survival and
persistence of H5N1 virus in simple biotopes containing only
water and mud (A), and in complex biotopes that included aquatic
flora and fauna (B) (See Table 1 for details). Two additional series
of experiments were set up in order to precisely characterize the
role of some aquatic animals in the persistence of H5N1 virus in
aquatic environments. The roles of mussels (bivalve molluscs) (C)
and endemic Betta splendens fish (fighting fish; Osphronemidae family)
as well as tadpoles (D) were investigated (see Figures 1 and 2 for
details).
Different virus concentrations were tested in this study.
Concentrations of 2610
2 and 5610
2 EID50/mL of water were
chosen based on the quantity of virus found in the natural
environment in Cambodia during previous field studies [10,16].
The virus concentration of 5610
3 EID50/mL of water was
determined based on the estimation of the quantity of virus
particles that infected ducks might shed in a pond (number of
ducks adjusted to the size of the pond according to field
observations) [17]. Finally, a higher dose of virus (5610
4
EID50/mL of water) was also tested in order to study the virus
persistence in case of higher level of contamination.
Experiments of series A and B lasted 14 days each, and were
conducted using different H5N1 strains (A/Chicken/Cambodia/
LC1AL/2007 and A/Cambodia/408008/2005), different inocu-
lum doses (yielding final estimated concentrations of 5610
2,
5610
3 or 5610
4 EID50/mL water), and different temperatures
reflecting the parameters measured in the field during the
transmission season in Cambodia (22, 25, 32 or 34uC). Aquariums
with a total capacity of 28 litres (38638620 cm) were filled with
20 litres water and 5 kilograms mud each, and then were allowed
to settle for 24 hours prior to virus inoculation. Water and mud
from various origins were also tested: rain, lake, pond 1, pond 2 (as
defined above). When flora (about 100 g) and fauna (30 animals of
each species) were included in the experiments (B), collection of
samples from each of the species used (2 g of plant, 2 animals of
each species) was carried out during the first 3 days, and every
3 days from then on. Fifty millilitres of water and 5 grams of mud
samples were collected on a daily basis (Table 1).
Experiments in series C and D lasted from 8 to 20 days
depending on the setting chosen. The A/Cambodia/408008/
2005 strain was used for experiments C, while experiments D
involved the use of the virus A/Chicken/Cambodia/LC1AL/
2007. All biotopes created for experiments C and D used rain
water only. Aquariums filled with 10 litres of water and 40 mussels
each were used for experiments C. In experiments D, series of
small aquariums containing 500 mL of water and one male
fighting fish in addition to one tadpole were used for experiment
D1, while only one fighting fish was included in experiment D2
(Figure 2). In experiments C, the water was maintained at 25uCa t
all times, while it was kept at ambient BLS-3 laboratory
temperatures for experiments D. The temperature measured in
the water during experiment D varied from 15.1 to 22.5uC, but
usually stayed around 18–20uC with an average temperature of
17.4uC (Figure S1). Final estimated virus concentrations in
aquariums varied between 2610
2 (D) and 5610
4 EID50/mL
Influenza A(H5N1) Survival in Water
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e34160water (C). Water samples of 50 and 10 mL were collected daily
during experiments C and D, respectively (Figures 1 and 2).
For all aquariums, inoculation was carried out on day 0 (D0).
After collection, water and mud samples were stored in sterile
tubes at 280uC until testing. All aquatic animals were humanely
sacrificed, following the Animal Use Protocol defined by the
Animal Ethics Committee of Institut Pasteur in Cambodia (permit
number: AEC/IPC/004/2008), and subsequently dissected in
order to collect the main organs of interest: gills, intestines, fins,
scales, brain, and remaining carcass in fish; gills, digestive gland,
intestines, and remaining carcass in clams and mussels; gills,
intestines, and remaining carcass in tadpoles; all organs in snails.
Before dissection, the animals were washed 2 times with sterile
distilled water in order to avoid contamination of the organs by the
water contained in the aquarium.
Prior to testing, organs were weighed and placed into vials
containing 1 mL of viral transport medium (VTM) (sterile solution
at pH 7.2–7.4 containing 26.5 g/l of tryptose phosphate broth,
5 g/l of gelatine, 50 mg/l of fungizon, 1 million units/l of
penicillin, 1 g/l of streptomycin and 80 mg/l of gentamycin)
and stored at 280uC and in 10% formalin solution (prepared from
formaldehyde 37% commercial solution diluted in water) stored at
room temperature. Plant samples were also weighed and stored in
VTM at 280uC until use.
Each experiment conducted was coupled with a control
experiment, using the exactly same conditions, but without virus.
Preparation of samples for RNA extraction and/or virus
isolation
Virus concentration in water. All water samples were
concentrated using the method described by Khalenkov et al. [18],
to obtain a final volume of 1 mL of concentrate for each sample.
The limit of detection of this technique was 3610
22 EID50/ mL,
as previously determined [18].
Virus elution and concentration in mud. All mud
specimens collected went through an elution step with a 10%
beef extract solution at pH 7 followed by a polyethylene glycol-
precipitation (PEG) step for virus and RNA concentration, as
described previously [19]. The limit of detection of H5N1 virus in
mud was 1.6610
4 RNA copies/g of mud (approximately 50
TCID50/ g of mud) [20].
Precisely, for each mud sample, 5 grams were eluted in 25 mL
of elution buffer (10% beef extract solution). One millilitre of the
eluted sample was then kept for a first virus detection, while the
Figure 1. Design of experiments C and laboratory results to assess the role of bivalves (mussels) in the transmission cycle of H5N1
virus in water. The 3 horizontal rectangles represent different types of water in which mussels were immersed: contaminated vs non-contaminated.
Black-filled lines represent mussels immersed in contaminated water from day 0 (D0). White-filled lines represent naı ¨ve mussels immersed in non-
contaminated water from day 0. The two experiments are discernable and identified as C.1 and C.2 (a, b and c). Water samples were collected daily
from day 0 (D0) to day 9 (D9). Numbers not included in boxes correspond to viral loads measured in the water samples. When these numbers are
displayed in white color, this indicates that infectious virus was also detected. When the numbers are written in black color, this means that the virus
was not recovered after inoculation into eggs. Stars indicate collection of mussels’ organs for testing. White stars correspond to detection of
infectious virus. Black stars indicate that H5N1 virus was not recovered after inoculation into embryonated eggs. Numbers included in black boxes
correspond to average viral loads measured in mussels that were immersed in contaminated water. Numbers in white boxes correspond to average
viral loads measured in mussels that were immersed in clean water.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.g001
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with PEG so as to obtain a final volume of concentrated sample of
1 mL. Mud eluates and concentrates were then used for RNA
extraction and qRT-PCR or virus isolation.
Homogenization of animal and vegetal samples. All solid
samples (animals’ organs, plants) were weighed and kept in 1 mL
VTM before undergoing a homogenization step using the MagNa
Lyser Instrument (ROCHE, Mannheim, Germany) for 3 runs of
50 seconds at 50006g. The homogenized samples were then used
for further RNA extraction and eventually virus isolation.
Total nucleic acid extraction and amplification by real-
time RT-PCR
All samples processed as described above were mixed with
a solution containing a mixture of antibiotics and antifungal drugs
prior to RNA extraction or virus isolation, in order to reduce the
number of contaminating microorganisms in the samples [18,19].
MagNa Pure LC Total Nucleic Acid Isolation Kit (Roche
Diagnostics) on MagNa Pure LC Instrument (Roche Diagnostics
GmbH, Mannheim, Germany) were then used for viral RNA
extraction of all eluated/concentrated/homogenized samples
(200 mL), following the manufacturers’ recommendations. Quan-
titative real-time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) targeting the hemaggluti-
nin (H5), matrix (MA) and neuraminidase (N1) genes were
performed on all RNA extracted. H5, MA and N1 synthetic RNA
were used as internal controls and for quantification. Water and
mud samples mixed with H5N1 virus at a concentration higher
than the limit of detection were used as positive controls [19]. No
positive controls were available for testing the animal and plant
specimens.
Virus isolation in embryonated hen eggs
All samples that tested positive by qRT-PCR were inoculated
into 9-to-11-days old SPF embryonated hen eggs. Each specimen
was inoculated into 3 eggs. One hundred microlitres were injected
into the amniotic cavity and 100 mL into the allantoic cavity. The
eggs were then incubated for 48 hours at 37uC and chilled
overnight at 4uC. The AAF was then harvested and standard
Figure 2. Design of experiments D and laboratory results to assess the role of Betta splendens fish in the transmission cycle of H5N1
virus in water. The 3 horizontal rectangles represent different types of water in which animals were immersed: contaminated vs non-contaminated.
Tadpoles (T) were immersed along with the male fighting fish (F) in contaminated water. Black-filled lines represent the male fighting fish and the
tadpoles immersed in contaminated water from day 0 (D0). At day 5, male contaminated fish were placed over-night in clean water before being
exposed to non-contaminated females in clean water. White-filled lines represent naı ¨ve female fighting fish immersed in non-contaminated water
from day 0. Stars indicate collection of fish and tadpoles (when present) for testing. The two experiments are discernable and identified as D.1 and
D.2. White stars correspond to detection of infectious virus in fish. Black stars indicate that H5N1 virus was not recovered from fish’s organs after
inoculation into embryonated eggs. Numbers included in black boxes correspond to average viral loads measured in fish (F) and tadpoles (T) that
were immersed in contaminated water. Numbers in white boxes correspond to average viral loads measured in female fighting fish that were
immersed in clean water and exposed to contaminated male fish. Water samples were collected from contaminated water (experiment D.1) from
day 0 (D0) up to day 20 (D20). Water samples were collected from non-contaminated water (experiment D.2) from day 0 (D0) to day 12 (D12). The
values presented in italic correspond to the viral load measured in water samples. When the numbers in italic are displayed in white color, this
indicates that infectious virus was also detected. When the numbers in italic are written in black color, this means that the virus was not recovered
after inoculation into eggs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.g002
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of virus before confirmation by qRT-PCR. HA tests were
performed in 96-wells microtiter plates with 0.75% guinea pig
red blood cells and serial 2-fold dilutions of AAF. When the HA
test was negative, the AAF from each of the three eggs was pooled
Table 1. Experimental conditions used for the study in simple (A) and complex (B) biotopes.
Series # Virus origin
a
Virus concentration
(EID50/mL water) Tu
b
Water
origin Mud origin
Flora/
fauna
Simple biotopes (A) A.1. Avian 5610
4 25 Pond 1 NA No
Pond 2
Rain
Human 5610
4 25 Pond 1 NA No
Pond 2
Lake
Rain
A.2. A.2.1. Avian 5610
4 25 Pond 1 Pond 1 No
Pond 2 Pond 2
Lake Lake
A.2.2. Avian 5610
2 22 Pond 2 Pond 2 No
25 Pond 1 Pond 1
32 Pond 2 Pond 2
34 Pond 1 Pond 1
Human 5610
3 25 Lake Lake No
32
Complex biotopes
(B)
B.1 Avian 5610
2 25 Pond 1 Pond 1 Guppies
Snails
Clams
Plants
5610
4 Lake Lake Guppies
Snails
Clams
Mussels
Plants
Human 5610
3 25 Lake Lake Guppies
Tadpoles
Plants
5610
4 Guppies
Clams
Plants
B.2 Avian 5610
2 22 Pond 2 Pond 2 Guppies
Snails
32 Clams
Plants
34 Pond 1 Pond 1 Guppies
Snails
Clams
Plants
Human 5610
3 32 Lake Lake Guppies
Tadpoles
Plants
aAvian origin strain stands for the A/Chicken/Cambodia/LC1AL/2007 strain. Human origin strain stands for the A/Cambodia/408008/2005 strain.
bTu=Temperature (uC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.t001
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maximum of three passages were performed for each sample.
Histopathology and immunohistochemistry
Immunohistochemical staining of the tissues obtained from the
mussels and fish of experiment C and D was carried out for the
influenza nucleoprotein using HB65 (European Veterinary
Laboratories, Netherlands) as described in previously published
reports [21].
Results
Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus
RNA in water
Contaminated rain water was the only type of water from which
infectious particles could be recovered (Figures 3 and 4; Table S2),
although these viruses could not be detected any later than 4 days
post-inoculation. In the same experimental conditions, the virus of
human origin could not be isolated in embryonated eggs and
a trace of its RNA was detected for a shorter period of time than
when using the avian isolate (experiment A.1, Figure 3; Table S2).
When animals (without plants or mud) were introduced (experi-
ments C with mussels and D with fish and tadpoles) (Figure 4;
Table S2), infectious particles of both animal and human origins
were then isolated and the RNA persisted for a longer period than
in the presence of mud and plants, and at higher levels, especially
when the average water temperature was low (17uC).
No infectious particle could be isolated from contaminated lake
water, although viral RNA was detectable between 1 to 11 days
post-inoculation depending on the conditions tested (Figures 3 and
5; Table S2).
No infectious particles could be recovered from pond water. In
one instance, viral RNA persisted in water for as long as 14 days
(end of the experiment) (experiment A.2.2, Pond 1, Figure 3;
Table S2) although at very low titre at this last testing point (52
RNA copies/mL). In all other experiments, viral RNA was
detected from contaminated pond water, from 2 to 14 days post-
inoculation, with viral loads varying from 2 to 1700 RNA copies/
mL.
Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus
RNA in mud
Infectious particles could not be recovered from any mud
samples in any of the experiments conducted in this study (Figure 3
and 5; Table S3). Viral RNA could always be detected by qRT-
PCR in mud specimens between 1 to 14 days after inoculation.
When only considering the mud samples obtained from the lake,
the RNA of the avian strain seemed to persist for longer periods
(13–14 days) than the RNA of the human isolate (1–8 days),
regardless of the other parameters (experiment B.1, Figure 5;
Tables S3 and S7). Globally, in experiments A and B using the
avian strain, RNA was detectable for longer periods of time in
mud (10 to 14 days) than in water specimens (1 to 7 days), except
for one experiment in which viral RNA was still detectable in both
water and mud specimens until the very end of the experiment
(experiment A.2.2, Figure 3 and 5; Tables S2, S3 and S7). The
viral loads measured in the water samples were on an average
3000 times lower than those observed in mud specimens. With the
human strain the durations of RNA persistence in water and mud
were comparable but the viral loads were approximately
4700 times higher in mud than in water (Table S7).
Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus
RNA in aquatic flora and fauna
Infectious particles were only isolated from animal organs in
experiments C and D, in which mussels, tadpoles and fighting fish
were immersed in contaminated rain water in the absence of mud
(Figure 4, Table S4). Survival of infectious particles ranged from
1 day in tadpoles and fighting fish (H5N1 strain of avian origin) to
6 days in mussels (with virus of human origin). RNA was detected
in tadpoles up to 14 days after immersion in contaminated water
(last day of the experiment) and until the end of respectively the 8
and 20 days of experiment in mussel and fighting fish. Viral loads
detected in the organs of these animals were relatively high,
ranging from 10
2 to 10
7 copies per gram (Figure 1 and 2;
Tables S4, S5 and S6). The viral loads detected in the different
organs of mussels and fish tested did not show any significant
tendencies, and thus did not allow us to draw any conclusions
regarding possible specific H5N1 tropisms towards certain organs
in these aquatic animals, be it for the avian or the human strain
(Tables S5 and S6). As for the other aquatic animals and for the
plants, only few samples tested positive by RT-PCR (Figure 5;
Table S4). Viral RNA persistence varied from 1 to 9 days. RNA
could not be detected in the snail species used, nor in any of the
animals or plants maintained at a temperature .32uC (Figure 5;
Table S4). RNA from the human strain persisted only in guppy
fish, whereas RNA from H5N1 virus of avian origin was detected
only in clams.
The clams immersed in contaminated water died very quickly,
in contrast with those immersed in non-infected water. The
presence of mud in lake or pond water (experiments B.1 and B.2)
was associated with the absence of infectious particle isolation in
tadpoles and with a shorter persistence of virus RNA at a lower
viral load (Figure 5; Table S4). In contrast, in the absence of mud,
infectious virus was detected on day 1 and the virus RNA persisted
for at least 14 days at a high viral load in the animals (experiment
D, Figure 4; Tables S4, S6 and S7).
Transmission of H5N1 virus between bivalve mollucs
(experiments C) and between fighting fish
(experiments D)
After immersion of mussels in rain water maintained at 25uC
and contaminated with the virus A/Cambodia/408008/2005,
infectious particles were isolated from water until day 4, from
mussels until day 6 and the virus RNA was still detectable in
molluscs until the end of the experiment at day 8. Viral loads in
mussels varied between 2.40610
5 copies on day 1 and 2.30610
4
copies per gram of organ on day 8 (experiment C.2, Figure 1).
When transferred into non-contaminated water on day 3
(experiment C.1), RNA was detected in water until day 4 but
infectious particles were not found. Infectious virus was not
isolated in the infected mussels transferred into clean water on
day 6 but the qRT-PCR tested positive until the end of the
experiment (experiment C.1., Figure 1). The last viral loads
measured were comparable to those of the mussels of the group
maintained in contaminated water and interestingly, comparable
quantities of RNA were detected in contaminated and exposed
molluscs (experiment C.1, Figure 1; Table S5).
When infected mussels were introduced into clean water on
day 4 (experiment C.2), no virus could be isolated from the
molluscs on day 5, and the water was not contaminated by
infectious particles nor by RNA. However, RNA was still detected
in infected mussels until day 8 (end of the experiments) and until
day 7 in mussels exposed to infected ones (experiment C.2,
Figure 1; Table S5).
Influenza A(H5N1) Survival in Water
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immersed in contaminated rain water. The virus was isolated from
animal organs until day 1 in both species and in water until day 2.
RNA was detected in tadpoles until day 14 (last tadpole tested) and
until day 20 (end of the experiment) in both water and fish. Viral
loads varied from 2.8610
7 copies on day 1 to 1.55610
5 copies per
gram of organ on day 14 for tadpoles, and from 4.73610
6 copies
to 1.48610
4 copies per gram of organ on day 20 for fighting fish
(experiment D.1, Figure 2). When contaminated fighting fish were
placed into clean water on day 6, no infectious virus could be
isolated from fish or from water. RNA persisted in water until the
end of the experiment on day 12 (viral load : 1.60610
2 copies/
mL) but in fish only until D7, in both infected and exposed animals
with 1 log difference in viral loads measured in their organs
(experiment D.2, Figure 2).
The viral loads presented here referred to the highest individual
values found when analyzing the different organs in each animal
group (Tables S5 and S6). In guppy fish, the highest mean viral
load was measured in gills (9.1610
5 copies/g) followed by fins
(4.8610
5 copies/g), while the values obtained in the other organs
varied from 4.5610
4 to 2.8610
5 copies/g. In contaminated
fighting fish, the highest mean viral loads were observed in gills
(1.05610
6 copies/g) and brain (4.11610
5 copies/g), while the viral
loads measured in the other organs collected varied from
1.90610
3 to 2.93610
6 copies/g (Table S6). In tadpoles, the viral
loads were quite similar in all organs (between 1.79 and 2.80610
7
copies/g for tadpole immersed during 1 day in infected water and
between 9.83610
4 and 5.82610
5 copies/g for tadpole kept 13–
14 days in contaminated water) (Table S6). In clams, viral loads
varied between 3.8610
3 and 6.28610
4 copies/g depending on the
organ tested.
Histopathology and immunohistochemistry
Immunohistochemical staining of the tissues did not confirm the
presence of the H5N1 virus antigen in any organ of the mussels
and fish tested following experiments C and D.
Discussion
This study aimed to recreate simple as well as complex aquatic
environments with parameters (pH, temperature, salinity, micro-
organisms, flora, fauna, etc.) as close as possible to those observed
in Cambodia, where H5N1 outbreaks are regularly reported, and
to observe the survival of the HPAI H5N1 virus in all the different
Figure 3. Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus RNA in simple biotopes (experiments A). A.1: only water of various
origins maintained at 25uC and inoculated to a final concentration of 5610
4 EID50/mL with H5N1 virus of animal or avian origin. A.2:water and mud
containing an estimated final concentration of virus of avian origin of 5610
4 EID50/mL water maintained at 25uC (A.2.1) or various concentrations of
viruses of avian and human origins and maintained at various temperatures (A.2.2). A: Avian origin strain stands for the A/Chicken/Cambodia/LC1AL/
2007 strain. H: Human origin strain stands for the A/Cambodia/408008/2005 strain.*last day of the corresponding experiment at which samples could
be collected and tested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.g003
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suggested to be at the origin of asymptomatic or sub-clinical
human infections [4,22]. Infected ducks can shed a large number
of virus particles in their faeces but also in saliva and nasal
discharge which can therefore easily lead to water contamination
[23]. The survival of avian influenza viruses in natural or artificial
environments has already been studied in several occasions and
a recent review of Stallknecht and Brown commented that the
persistence of HPAI H5N1 virus in the environment was still
poorly explored [8].
In our experiments, infectious HPAI H5N1 virus could be
recovered from water during a maximum of 4 days post-
contamination at 25uC but only in rain water. This temperature
is commonly observed all year long in Cambodian ponds and
lakes, around 20240 cm beneath the surface, as opposed to the
surface where the temperature can easily exceed 30uC. The
survival of AIVs in water is known to be shorter when temperature
increases [8]. Interestingly, in similar conditions, infectious
particles could not be isolated from any of the natural surface
water specimens tested (ponds and lake). The pH values measured
in this study varied between 7.45 and 8 which were described to be
the optimal conditions to maintain the AIVs infectivity [8]. The
main physicochemical and microbiological parameters which
differed between rain and pond/lake water specimens were: a total
absence of chemical oxygen demand (parameter used to indirectly
evaluate the organic compounds) with globally lower concentra-
tions of nitrite and nitrate, a higher concentration of sodium and
a globally less abundant bacteriological flora in rain water
(Table S1). Nazir et al. examined the survival of low pathogenic
avian influenza (LPAI) strains and reported that at 20–30uC, the
persistence of the viruses was longest in distilled water, second
longest in normal saline solution and shortest in surface water [24].
Others demonstrated that the presence of living microorganisms in
some waters reduced AIV survival [5,23–25]. These data are in
line with our observations which suggest that at the temperature
naturally observed in tropical countries like Cambodia, the
presence of organic contaminants and microorganisms in natural
surface waters are strongly affecting the H5N1 virus survival in
water. Additionally, although our samples underwent standard
bacteriological analyses, water specimens could have contained
a whole range of other microorganisms, including fungi and other
microbes, which have not been investigated and which could have
potentially been interacting in some unknown way with influenza
virus particles. Clean water, which can be found in wells, in some
containers, in puddles, etc., are in contrast favourable to the H5N1
virus survival and this seems not to be depending on the initial
concentration of the virus i.e. the level of virus contamination.
Interestingly, although experiments were conducted under
identical conditions, the H5N1 virus obtained from a human case
did not survive in rain water in the absence of fauna. Other
authors reported that in experiments where only pH, salinity and
temperatures varied, H5N1 viruses appeared to persist for shorter
periods than other avian influenza viruses tested [11]. This
demonstrated an inter-subtype variation of virus tenacity in water
but our results also suggest the existence of an important intra-
subtype variation that could be explained by biological variations
resulting from differing replication abilities in different hosts, or by
yet unknown genetic mutations associated with virus survival in
abiotic environments.
The detection of virus RNA by qRT-PCR did not correlate
with the recovery of infectious particles. Indeed, in some
experiments, infectious virus could not be isolated while RNA
could be detected for several days. In the absence of mud, plants or
animals, RNA was detected for periods as long as 11 days at 25uC.
In complex biotopes, an increase of the temperature from 25uCt o
32uCo r3 4 uC reduced the persistence of the RNA (experiments
A2.2, Figure 3; Table S2). This is not surprising as RNA is known
to be heat labile.
Infectious particles were never isolated in mud specimens
although the method used was proven to be efficient [19]. LPAI
Figure 4. Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus RNA in water and fauna in experiments C and D. C: water inoculated
with the virus of human origin, at a final estimated concentration of 5610
4 EID50/mL, maintained at 25uC and containing mussels. D: water
inoculated with the virus of avian origin, at a final estimated concentration of 2610
2 EID50/mL, maintained at 17uC and containing fighting fish and
tadpoles.*last day of the corresponding experiment at which samples could be collected and tested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.g004
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temperatures ranging from 20 to 30uC in some lake sediments
[26]. The nature of the soil in Cambodia or the biological
characteristics of the HPAI H5N1 virus may explain why the
viruses did not survive in our mud specimens. It has been
described that avian influenza viruses are relatively unstable in the
environment due to their lipid envelopes readily being inactivated
by several physical factors, organic solvents, and detergents [23].
However, this low detection of infectious particles may also be
related to detection limits. For instance, adsorption of live virus on
soil micro-particles, or contamination of the samples with
environmental bacteria, fungi, or other microorganisms despite
prior treatment, could prevent the growth of the virus in hen egg
cultures [18,27–30]. As in water, the persistence of the avian
H5N1 RNA tends to last longer than that of the human H5N1
strain in the mud, possibly for the same reasons as suggested
above. Moreover, RNA persisted for longer periods in mud than
in water. Previous publications supported the idea that AIVs could
survive for longer in lake sediments than in lake water [26] and
that lake and pond sediments could act as a reservoir of influenza
viruses [31]. Our experiments cannot lead to similar conclusions as
we did not isolate infectious particles from mud but mud and
sediments may be preventing RNA from decay within the
nucleoprotein, thus allowing it to be detected by qRT-PCR [31–
33] even though PCR inhibitors are expected to decrease the
detection rate of viral RNA in mud. Indeed, in our experiments,
such inhibitors were detected in 50% of the soil and mud samples
collected from the natural environment in Cambodia (Institut
Pasteur in Cambodia, unpublished data). Several authors
demonstrated that virus detection in environmental samples could
indeed be strongly influenced by many substances present in
environmental samples, such as bentonite clay, humic acid or
mussel tissue, that can inhibit RT-PCR [34].
The detection thresholds of the assays could also be questioned
but the quantity of virus inoculated at the beginning of the
experiments should have ended in theoretical concentrations in
water and mud above the limit of detection of these methods.
Nevertheless, as we did not perform back-titrations immediately
after virus inoculation in water, we cannot dismiss the possibility
that the starting concentrations were lower than those calculated
by simply applying a dilution factor. The initial virus titers used
may appear low but they were comparable to those observed in
the field during environmental investigation following outbreak in
poultry in Cambodian farms [10,16]. Indeed, one of the main
objective of these experiments was to study the persistence of
H5N1 virus in conditions as close as possible to the field. The low
Figure 5. Survival of infectious particles and persistence of virus RNA in complex biotopes (experiments B). B.1: complex biotopes
inoculated with virus of avian or human origins at various final concentrations and maintained at 25uC. B.2: complex biotopes inoculated with virus of
avian or human origins at various final concentrations and maintained at various temperatures. A: Avian origin strain stands for the A/Chicken/
Cambodia/LC1AL/2007 strain. H: Human origin strain stands for the A/Cambodia/408008/2005 strain.*last day of the corresponding experiment at
which samples could be collected and tested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034160.g005
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distribution of the virus in the aquarium, although we tried to limit
this bias by gently homogenizing the water in the aquarium with
a long pipette and by collecting each sample at 4–5 different
locations.
To our knowledge, data related to the infection of aquatic
animals by AIVs in general is very rare and we did not find any
study evaluating interactions between H5N1 virus and aquatic
plants either.
The plants maintained in H5N1- infected water in conditions
meant to simulate natural ones in Cambodia did not show any
contamination by the virus regardless of the virus type and of the
virus concentration except for one plant specimen in which viral
RNA was detected during the first day of the experiment. This
finding is in agreement with the investigation conducted on
natural environmental samples collected after an H5N1 outbreak
in Cambodia in 2006, which assessed the presence of viral RNA in
plants from which no live virus particles were recovered [10]. This
suggests that aquatic plants may not help virus survival, nor act as
physical support for viral particles dispersed in water.
When molluscs, fish or tadpoles were introduced in aquariums
containing rain water, infectious particles of the strain of human
origin could subsequently be recovered and the RNA persistence
of both human and avian strains increased significantly (up to
20 days in one experiment). This suggests a probable impact of
these aquatic animals on the biological cycle of H5N1 virus. Faust
et al. highlighted in 2009 the role of clams (Corbicula fluminea)i n
removing - by filtration - the virus from the water, and in reducing
the infectivity of LPAI virus [13]. Another study reported that
zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha) were able to accumulate LPAI
virus from the surrounding water, and to retain the virus in their
bodies over an extended period of time before releasing the virus
back into freshwater [14]. As shown on Figure 1, the viral RNA
persisted in water until the last day of the experiment (day 8) even
in the presence of mussels. We observed a decrease of the viral
load measured in water (3 logs in 8 days) but also in mussels (1 log
in 8 day). In experiment C, infectious particles were detected in
water during 4 days, and during 6 days in mussels (Figure 1).
Once transferred to clean water, the infectious particles disap-
peared from the mussels and did not contaminate the water. Virus
RNA was detected for few days in infected and exposed mussels. It
seems that the species of mussel used in our experiments did not
favor the detection of infectious H5N1 virus in water (by
comparison with water alone). The animals probably filtered
and concentrated the RNA to some extent but also probably
released some nucleic acids since the initially clean water was
slightly contaminated afterwards, and that virus RNA was
detected in mussels exposed to infected ones. Our experiments
suggest that mussels may be able to at least release nucleic acids in
the environment. If they released some infectious virus, it was
below the detection threshold of our technique.
Histopathology suggested that the virus was not replicating in
mussels and thus that the detection of infectious particles in these
molluscs was probably only the result of their natural capacity to
filter water. However, this observation may also only be the result
of the lower sensitivity of the immunohistochemical method
compared to qRT-PCR. Fish (Betta splendens) and tadpoles carried
detectable HPAI H5N1 virus particles for 1 day only, while
infectious particles were isolated from the seeded water until
day 2. Interestingly, fish and tadpoles as well as water specimens
tested positive by qRT-PCR for 20 days while RNA persisted for
a maximum length of 9 days in aquariums containing only rain
water (experiment A.1). After 1 day of transit of the infected fish in
clean water, the RNA was transmitted to exposed fish for only
a short period of time. But surprisingly, the initially non-
contaminated water tested positive by qRT-PCR for an additional
5 days. The histopathology analyses did not show the presence of
virus antigen in the animal tissues tested, suggesting that the virus
was not replicating in these tissues. Nevertheless, because of the
limited sensitivity of this method, this result should be interpreted
with caution. Fish and tadpoles seemed to be able to concentrate
the RNA but not the infectious virus in their organs, and to
efficiently protect this RNA from decay. These animals also
released nucleic acids in water, allowing the detection of H5N1
virus by qRT-PCR for longer periods. Their gills probably acted
as filtration systems while the RNA detected in their intestines was
probably only the result of the passage of the RNA through the
digestive tract, presumably together with food. The detection of
nucleic acids but not of infectious virus in fish’s organ tissues,
including in brain, could be the result of a contamination with
nucleic acids from contaminated water during the delicate
dissection of the tiny animals, although the animals were all
washed in sterile distilled water before the dissection.
As often demonstrated through the years, aquatic waterfowl
such as ducks, when infected, can shed large amount of virus in
their feces, saliva and nasal discharge, all of these potentially
resulting in environmental contamination [23,35]. Indeed, in
several instances, environmental surfaces, including water, were
found to be contaminated by HPAI H5N1 virus during or after
outbreaks in poultry [9,10,17,33,35]. Thus, as shown in our study
in waters heavily contaminated by the virus, aquatic molluscs or
fish could be passive carriers of avian influenza H5N1 virus and
may potentially contaminate domestic or wild birds but also
human hosts if correct cleaning and cooking conditions are not
applied prior to consumption.
It should be noted that even though this study was meant to
reproduce as faithfully as possible the real field conditions, our
experiments differed from those by many elements, including the
nature of the inoculum. While most environmental materials are
contaminated by faeces, saliva, or other organic secretions, our
inoculum was amnio-allantoic fluid. In the field, however, it is
noteworthy that influenza viruses are protected by organic
materials such as nasal secretions or faeces, which may increase
their resistance to physical and chemical inactivation [23].
Although in our experimental study HPAI H5N1 infectious
virus could not be detected in environmental water and mud from
pond and lake origins, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
virus could survive in different areas where physico-chemical and
microbiological parameters could differ. Indeed, previous studies
suggested that even minor fluctuations in temperature, pH and
salinity at levels normally encountered in natural aquatic habitats
may enhance or diminish environmental persistence [8]. In
addition, we may not have selected for our experiments the
strains that had the best fitness to persist in the environment. The
persistence of viral RNA for periods of 2 weeks in environmental
materials is an indicator that at some time, even for a short period,
infectious particles were present. Thus, we can not rule out the risk
of human contamination from the environment, especially since
this risk was suggested and reported in several investigations
[4,6,9,22,36–38]. A contaminated environment could provide
a continuing source of virus, and restricted access of human and
animals to potentially contaminated ponds and lakes should be
recommended during and after outbreaks in addition to in-
formation regarding the potential risk encountered during
collection and consumption of aquatic molluscs or fish. In
particular, bathing or swimming activities in contaminated ponds
in Cambodia have been clearly identified as a risk factor for
human contamination by H5N1 virus [4,22]. Additional factors
Influenza A(H5N1) Survival in Water
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environment are still to be elucidated, but our results, along with
previous data, support the idea that environmental surveillance is
of major relevance for avian influenza control programs.
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